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“Arbitrage CDOs” have recorded an explosive growth during the years before the outbreak of 
the financial crisis. In the present paper we discuss potential sources of such arbitrage 
opportunities, in particular arbitrage gains due to mispricing. For this purpose we examine the 
risk profiles of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) in some detail. The analyses reveal 
significant differences in the risk profile between CDO tranches and corporate bonds, in 
particular concerning the considerably increased sensitivity to systematic risks. This has far-
reaching consequences for risk management, pricing and regulatory capital requirements. A 
simple analytical valuation model based on the CAPM and the single-factor Merton model is 
used in order to keep the model framework simple. Then, the conditional expected loss curve 
(EL profile) is studied in some detail. In the next step, the asset correlation associated with a 
CDO tranche is estimated treating the structured instrument as a single-name credit 
instrument (i.e., a loan equivalent). While tractable, the loan-equivalent approach requires 
appropriate parameterization to achieve a reasonable approximation of the tranche´s risk 
profile. We consider the tranche as a “virtual” borrower or bond for which a single-factor 
model holds. Then, the correlation parameter is calculated via a non-linear optimization. This 
“bond representation” allows to approximate the risk profile (expressed by the EL profile) 
using a single-factor model and to express the dependence on the systematic risk factor via 
the corresponding asset correlation. It turns out that the resulting asset correlation is many 
times higher than that of straight bonds. Then, the Merton type valuation model for the 
corresponding bond representations is applied for valuation of the CDO tranches. Using a 
sample CDO portfolio, some opportunities for “CDO arbitrage” are described where it is 
assumed that investors are guided solely by the tranches’ rating and ignore the increased 
systematic risk for pricing. In the next section we discuss how tranches with high systematic 
risk can be generated and how CDO arrangers can exploit this to their advantage. It comes as 
no surprise that precisely these types of structures featured in many of the CDOs issued prior 
to the outbreak of the financial crisis.  
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Due to the information asymmetry between the originators of structured finance instruments 
and the investors and the lack of reliable data on the collateral pools even sophisticated 
investors with the necessary knowledge were not able to conduct an extensive valuation and 
risk analysis of the structured instruments. So they treated them like corporate or sovereign 
bonds and relied solely on the agencies’ ratings. The use of the same rating scale for CDO 
tranches and corporate bonds by the rating agencies obviously hid that there is a significantly 
different risk profile also at the same credit rating with regard to the systematic risk. 
Structured finance instruments appeared very attractive to investors as they could choose 
between different risk/return profiles. Moreover, CDO tranches tended to offer more yield 
than corporate bonds or loans with similar ratings.  
Among CDOs, “arbitrage CDOs” in particular have recorded enormous growth. Arbitrage 
CDOs attempt to produce a surplus from the collateral pool’s acquired assets on the one hand, 
and from the tranches sold to the investors after securitization on the other hand. In the 
present paper we discuss potential CDO arbitrage opportunities due to mispricing. For this 
purpose the risk profiles of CDO tranches are analysed in some detail. The analyses presented 
here reveal significant risk profile differences between CDOs and corporate bonds which have 
far-reaching consequences for risk management, pricing and regulatory capital requirements. 
Particularly due to the increased sensitivity to systematic risks, CDOs become much riskier 
investments than comparable corporate bonds. This results inter alia in rapid and drastic 
rating downgrades once the underlying economic environment comes under stress. Another 
major consequence stems from the price relevance of systematic risks. The considerably 
increased systematic risk of CDO tranches needs to be compensated for by a significantly 
higher spread than is usually paid for corporate bonds. If investors do not appreciate the 
increased systematic risk, this offers arbitrage opportunities for the CDO issuers.  
Coval/Jurek/Stafford (2009a, b) and Brennan/Hein/Poon (2009) analyse similar aspects of a 
possible mispricing of CDO tranches. As in the present paper, the authors argue that investors 
who solely rely on the rating generally pay a too high price for the CDO tranches. According 
to Coval/Jurek/Stafford (2009a), this is especially true for senior tranches which default just 
when the economy is in a very bad state. If a broad equity index is used as a proxy for the 
market factor, option prices can be used. Using special options on the S&P 500 index with 
comparable systematic risks, the authors show empirically that the highly rated tranches of the 
CDX index exhibit market spreads that are significantly too low. By contrast, the results 
obtained by Brennan/Hein/Poon (2009) indicate that the AAA-rated tranches are only 
marginally mispriced, and that the highest profits can be gained with junior tranches.  
 
In contrast to these papers we attempt to quantify the size of the CDOs’ sensitivity to 
systematic risks as precisely as possible, while keeping the model framework relatively 
simple. For this, a single factor model is assumed for the collateral pool assets, and the loss 
distribution is calculated. Then each of the expected tranche losses are analysed conditional 
on the market factor realisations. It turns out that expected loss curve conditional on the 
market factor (EL profile) is much steeper for unfavourable market factor values than for a 
bond with a comparable rating or for the collateral pool. This expresses the greatly increased 
sensitivity of the tranches to systematic risk. In the next step, the asset correlation associated 
with a CDO tranche is estimated treating the structured instrument as a single-name credit 
instrument (i.e., a loan equivalent). While tractable, the loan-equivalent approach requires 
appropriate parameterization to achieve a reasonable approximation of the tranche´s risk 
profile. We consider the tranche as a “virtual” borrower or bond for which a single-factor 
model holds. Then, the correlation parameter is calculated via a non-linear optimization. This 
“bond representation” allows to approximate the risk profile (expressed by the EL profile) 
using a single-factor model and to express the dependence on the systematic risk factor via 
the corresponding asset correlation. It turns out that the resulting asset correlation is many 
times higher than that of ordinary bonds. In the next step a pricing model which depends 
explicitly on the asset correlation as a measure of systematic risk is implemented for the CDO 
tranches. CDO arbitrage opportunities are then described using a sample CDO portfolio. It is 
assumed that investors are guided solely by the tranches’ rating and ignore the increased 
systematic risk. We subsequently show how tranches with high systematic risk can be 
generated and describe how CDO arrangers can exploit this to their advantage. It comes as no 
surprise that precisely these types of structures featured in many of the CDOs issued prior to 













Die Informationsasymmetrie zwischen den Originatoren von komplexen strukturierten 
Kreditprodukten wie CDOs und den Investoren wurde massiv verstärkt durch die mangelnde 
Verfügbarkeit zeitnaher Daten zu den Collateral Pools. Auch für Investoren mit dem 
notwendigen Knowhow war es nicht möglich, eine umfassende Bewertung und Risikoanalyse 
der strukturierten Produkte vorzunehmen. Viele Investoren haben CDO-Tranchen wie 
Corporate oder Sovereign Bonds betrachtet und sich vollständig auf die Ratings der Produkte 
verlassen. Die Verwendung derselben Ratingskala für CDO-Tranchen und Corporate Bonds 
durch die Ratingagenturen hat offensichtlich verschleiert, dass auch bei gleichem Rating ein 
signifikant unterschiedliches Risikoprofil hinsichtlich des systematischen Risikos vorliegt. Da 
die Investoren entsprechend ihrem Rendite-/Risikoprofil aus verschiedenen Tranchen 
auswählen konnten und darüber hinaus die strukturierten Produkte anfänglich höhere Spreads 
zahlten, erschienen sie sehr attraktiv.  
Bei den CDOs haben insbesondere die „Arbitrage-CDOs“ ein enormes Wachstum 
verzeichnet. Arbitrage-CDOs versuchen einen Überschuss aus den erworbenen Assets des 
Collateral Pools einerseits und den nach der Strukturierung an die Investoren verkauften 
Tranchen andererseits zu erzielen. Für das Zustandekommen der CDO-Arbitrage gibt es in 
der Literatur unterschiedliche Begründungen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird untersucht, wie 
durch Fehlbepreisungen Möglichkeiten zur CDO-Arbitrage entstehen. Hierzu werden die 
Risikoprofile von CDO-Tranchen im Detail untersucht und potentielle Unterschiede zu 
Corporate Bonds mit vergleichbaren Ratings genauer überprüft. Die vorgestellten Analysen 
zeigen signifikante Differenzen im Risikoprofil zwischen CDOs und Corporate Bonds, 
welche weitreichende Konsequenzen in Bezug auf Risikomanagement, Bepreisung und 
regulatorische Eigenkapitalanforderungen haben. Dies betrifft vor allem die deutlich erhöhte 
Sensitivität gegenüber systematischen Risiken. Dadurch werden CDOs zu wesentlich 
riskanteren Investments als vergleichbare Corporate Bonds. Eine Konsequenz sind rapide und 
drastische Ratingänderungen (Downgrades), wenn die ökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen 
unter Stress geraten. Eine weitere wichtige Konsequenz, die für eine inadäquate Bepreisung 
ausschlaggebend ist,  ergibt sich aus der Preisrelevanz des systematischen Risikos. Das   
deutlich erhöhte systematische Risiko der CDO-Tranchen muss durch einen signifikant 
höheren Spread, als für Corporate Bonds gezahlt wird, kompensiert werden.  
Ähnliche Aspekte einer möglichen Fehlbepreisung von CDO-Tranchen untersuchen Coval et 
al. (2009a,b) und Brennan et al. (2009). Wie im vorliegenden Paper argumentieren die 
Autoren, dass Investoren, die sich lediglich am Rating orientieren, in der Regel einen zu 
hohen Preis für die CDO-Tranchen bezahlen. Gemäß Coval et al. (2009a) gilt dies im 
besonderen Maße für die Senior-Tranchen, die gerade dann ausfallen, wenn sich die  
 
Ökonomie in einem sehr schlechten Zustand befindet. Diese Zustände haben jedoch einen 
hohen marginalen Nutzen und die zugehörigen Zustandspreise sollten gemäß der 
Arrow/Debreu-Theorie hoch sein. Anhand spezieller Optionen auf einen Marktindex mit 
vergleichbaren systematischen Risiken zeigen sie, dass die hoch gerateten Tranchen des CDX 
Index signifikant zu niedrige Marktspreads aufweisen. Im Gegensatz dazu finden Brennan et 
al. (2009) heraus, dass die AAA-Tranchen nur geringfügig fehlbepreist sind und dass die 
höchsten Gewinne bei der Tranchierung mit den riskanteren Junior-Tranchen erzielt werden 
können. 
Im Unterschied zu den beiden Arbeiten wird im vorliegenden Beitrag versucht, die 
Größenordnung der Sensitivität von CDOs gegenüber systematischen Risiken möglichst exakt 
zu quantifizieren. Dabei soll der Modellrahmen möglichst einfach gehalten werden. Hierzu 
wird für die Assets des Collateral Pools ein Ein-Faktor-Modell unterstellt und die 
Verlustverteilung ermittelt. Dann werden die erwarteten Verluste der Tranchen jeweils 
bedingt auf die Realisierungen des Marktfaktors analysiert. Die bedingte Expected-Loss-
Kurve (EL-Profil) wird mit Hilfe einer Simulation ermittelt. Im nächsten Schritt wird die 
Assetkorrelation einer CDO-Tranche geschätzt. Dabei wird die Tranche als „fiktiver“ 
Schuldner bzw. Bond aufgefasst, für den approximativ ebenfalls ein Ein-Faktor-Modell gilt. 
Die Approximation wird so vorgenommen, dass das simulierte EL-Profil möglichst gut 
nachgestellt wird, und der Korrelationsparameter wird mit Hilfe einer nichtlinearen 
Optimierung ermittelt. Durch die „Bond-Repräsentation“ gelingt es, das Risikoprofil von 
CDO-Tranchen mit Hilfe eines Ein-Faktor-Modells zu approximieren und die Abhängigkeit 
vom systematischen Risikofaktor durch den entsprechenden Korrelationsparameter 
auszudrücken. Die resultierende Assetkorrelation ist um ein Vielfaches höher als für 
gewöhnliche Bonds. Dann wird für die CDO-Tranchen ein Preismodell implementiert. Hierzu 
wird die risikoneutrale Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeit mit Hilfe des strukturellen 
Firmenwertmodells ermittelt und in Abhängigkeit von der realen Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeit 
und dem systematischen Risiko spezifiziert, wobei die Gültigkeit des (zeitstetigen) CAPM 
unterstellt wird. Danach werden anhand eines Beispiel-CDOs Möglichkeiten zur „CDO-
Arbitrage“ beschrieben, wenn sich die Investoren nur am Rating der Tranchen orientieren und 
das erhöhte systematische Risiko außer Acht lassen. Schließlich wird im letzten Kapitel die 
Konstruktion von Tranchen mit hohem systematischen Risiko dargestellt und beschrieben, 
wie dies von den CDO-Arrangeuren zu ihren Gunsten ausgenützt werden kann. Es ist nicht 
überraschend, dass gerade derartige Strukturen in vielen der in der Zeit vor Ausbruch der 
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Systematic Risk of CDOs and CDO Arbitrage* 
 
 
1   Introduction 
The technique of securitisation allows to transfer a portfolio of illiquid assets or the default 
risks associated with the assets to the structured credit markets using various credit transfer 
instruments and to distribute much of the underlying credit risk to end-investors. This led to a 
dramatic rise in the market for credit transfer instruments, especially Credit Default Swaps 
(CDS) und Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). For example, the volume of outstanding 
CDS has increased more than tenfold over the past few years. 
Among CDOs, “arbitrage CDOs” in particular have recorded enormous growth. Arbitrage 
CDOs attempt to produce a surplus from the collateral pool’s acquired assets on the one hand, 
and from the tranches sold to the investors after securitization on the other hand. The Figure 
below shows the issuance volumes between Q1 2004 and Q4 2008. The issuance volumes of 
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  Figure 1:  Issuance volumes of arbitrage CDOs and balance sheet CDOs between 2004 and 2008 
(source: SIFMA) 
 
In the case of arbitrage CDOs, there is a sharp increase until the beginning of the financial 
crisis from around US$23 billion in Q1 2004 to over US$155 billion in Q2 2007. A 
correspondingly large volume of loans had to be granted in order to generate this high volume 
of CDOs, with loans with higher yields (and greater risks) being preferred. This created a 
huge leap in the demand for subprime loans. CDO trusts were constantly looking for BBB-
rated MBS (mortgage backed securities) bonds, which offered relatively high yields. The 
CDO trust could finance their purchase by issuing highly rated CDO bonds (tranches) paying 
lower yields. The business was so lucrative that there were insufficient MBS bonds in 
circulation to form CDO collateral pools in 2006 and 2007. A solution was found with the 
introduction of credit default swaps on asset-backed securities (ABS CDS). The result was a 
large number of CDO collateral pools “topped up” with synthetic MBS bonds (MBS CDS). 
This environment encouraged questionable practices by some lenders, and lead to a dramatic 
fall in credit lending standards that was often described in the media.
1 
                                                 
1 For a description of the chronology and causes of the financial crisis, see, for example, Crouhy et al (2008), 
Hull (2009), van Deventer (2008), Ashcraft and Schürmann (2009), Krinsman (2007), Zimmerman (2007), Borio 
(2008), Rudoph (2008) or the German Council of Economic Experts (2007), Chapter 3.  
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The valuation by rating agencies is crucial for complex structured finance instruments such as 
CDOs. Due to their complexity, however, it is difficult to rate CDOs.  The waterfall structures 
and loss distributions are always different and have to be analysed and simulated on an 
individual basis. Also, many collateral pools contain synthetic ABS CDS, which increases the 
difficulty in rating these assets. 
A further problem is the information asymmetry between the originators of the structured 
finance instruments and the investors. Generally, data on the collateral pools are not available 
on  an individual basis, except for synthetic CDOs with corporate CDSs in the collateral pool. 
As the database had not been disclosed, investors had no reliable basis upon which to quantify 
the risks of these securities, and even investors with the necessary knowledge were not able to 
conduct an extensive valuation and risk analysis of the structured instruments. They had to 
almost completely rely on the agencies’ ratings. Even though the regulatory authorities have 
pointed out that the use of ratings does not excuse investors from conducting their own risk 
analyses, many of them relied in practice purely on external ratings for valuing structured 
credit products (see Bank of England, 2007). Many investors regarded CDO tranches like 
corporate or sovereign bonds with the same rating and, in particular, also equated their risks 
with those of bonds. 
Structured finance instruments appeared very attractive to investors as they could choose 
between different risk/return profiles. Moreover, CDO tranches tended to offer more yield 
than corporate bonds or loans with similar ratings. This price advantage did not last, however. 
Between 2005 and the beginning of the subprime crisis, rising investor confidence in the new 
asset class led to a rising demand. Thus the spread differences narrowed and CDOs and 
corporate bonds with comparable ratings were quoted at almost equal prices (see 
Brennan/Hein/Poon, 2009, Figure 1).  
In this paper, the risk profiles of CDO tranches are analysed in some detail and potential 
differences to corporate bonds that have comparable ratings are examined more closely. The 
analyses presented here reveal significant risk profile differences between CDOs and 
corporate bonds which have far-reaching consequences for risk management, pricing and 
regulatory capital requirements. Particularly due to the increased sensitivity to systematic 
risks CDOs become much riskier investments than comparable corporate bonds. This results 
inter alia in rapid and drastic rating downgrades once the underlying economic environment 
comes under stress. Another major consequence stems from the price relevance of systematic 
risks. The considerably increased systematic risk of CDO tranches needs to be compensated 
for by a significantly higher spread than is usually paid for corporate bonds. If investors do 
not appreciate the increased systematic risk, this offers arbitrage opportunities for the CDO 
issuers.   
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Coval/Jurek/Stafford (2009a,b) and Brennan/Hein/Poon (2009) analyse similar aspects of a 
possible mispricing of CDO tranches. As in the present paper, the authors argue that investors 
who solely rely on the rating generally pay a too high price for the CDO tranches. According 
to Coval/Jurek/Stafford (2009a), this is especially true for senior tranches which default just 
when the economy is in a very bad state. These states have a high marginal utility, however, 
and according to the Arrow-Debreu theory, the associated state prices should be high. If a 
broad equity index is used as a proxy for the market factor, option prices can be used. When 
the index does exhibit such unfavourable conditions, the “volatility skew” becomes important, 
and investors should be entitled to an additional spread for bearing this risk. Using special 
options on the S&P 500 index with comparable systematic risks, the authors show empirically 
that the highly rated tranches of the CDX index exhibit market spreads that are significantly 
too low. By contrast, Brennan/Hein/Poon (2009) find that the AAA-rated tranches are only 
marginally mispriced, and that the highest profits can be gained with junior tranches. 
In line with these two articles we also see limited risk assessment of CDO tranches prior to 
the crisis. Market participants based their investment decisions on a tranche’s rating grade and 
otherwise assumed default behaviour like that of straight bonds, in particular concerning the 
exposure to systematic risks. As a consequence non-equity CDO tranches were overvalued. In 
contrast to these articles, our objective is not precisely quantify the degree of mispricing in the 
CDO market. Instead we concentrate on an illustrative presentation of differences in the 
default behaviour of corporate bonds and CDO tranches using a single-factor model 
framework, which can be derived from a simple analytical valuation model based on the 
CAPM and the Merton model. This allows developing a parsimonious pricing approach. As it 
relates directly to the mentioned differences between bonds and CDO tranches and because of 
its less complicated structure it sheds light on the consequences of possible misjudgements 
concerning the risk properties of CDO tranches. By applying our valuation model on a sample 
arbitrage CDO transaction, we conclude that there is no CDO arbitrage possible as long as 
investors take the special default behaviour of CDO tranches into account. However, if 
investors base their investment decisions solely on the ratings of the CDO tranches, this 
creates a market environment that allows CDO arrangers to gain some kind of arbitrage profit.  
In contrast to the above mentioned papers, here we attempt to quantify the size of the CDOs’ 
sensitivity to systematic risks. For this purpose we analyse the expected tranche loss of a 
CDO tranche conditional on the market factor realisations (EL profile). In the next step, the 
asset correlation associated with a CDO tranche is estimated treating the structured instrument 
as a single-name credit instrument (i.e., a loan equivalent). While tractable, the loan-
equivalent approach requires appropriate parameterization to achieve a reasonable 
approximation of the tranche´s risk profile. We consider the tranche as a “virtual” borrower or  
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bond for which a single-factor model holds. Then, the correlation parameter is estimated via 
an approximation of the EL profile. This “bond representation” allows to approximate the risk 
profile using a single-factor model and to express the dependence on the systematic risk factor 
via the corresponding asset correlation. It turns out that the resulting asset correlation is many 
times higher than that of ordinary bonds. Then, the CDO tranches are priced by applying the 
valuation model to their corresponding bond representations. In the following section, 
opportunities for “CDO arbitrage” are described using a sample CDO portfolio. It is assumed 
that investors are guided solely by the tranches’ rating and ignore the increased systematic 
risk. We show how tranches with high systematic risk can be generated and describe how 
CDO arrangers can exploit this to their advantage. It comes as no surprise that precisely these 
types of structures featured in many of the CDOs issued prior to the outbreak of the financial 
crisis.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a simple analytic valuation 
model based on the CAPM and the single-factor Merton model of debt pricing. Section 3 
discusses pooling and tranching and reallocating risks. First, rating-based risk measures are 
presented. Then, the “bond representation” treating a CDO tranche as a single-name credit 
instrument is described. Section 4 illustrates tranche valuation and CDO arbitrage. In section 
5 is analysed how tranches with high systematic risk can be generated, and how CDO issuers 
can exploit this to their advantage. A discussion and conclusion is given in section 6. 
 
2   A framework for credit modelling and valuation 
Collateral pools of structured finance transactions are typically composed of assets like e. g. 
loans, bonds or CDS contracts. The risk properties of portfolio derivatives such as CDOs are 
influenced by the default behaviour of the collateral pool’s assets. Thus, modelling credit risk 
of plain vanilla credit instruments forms the basis of modelling credit risk of structured 
finance instruments. In addition, the valuation model for simple credit instruments, introduced 
in this chapter, will be developed further to a model for evaluating structured credit products. 
Asset-value-model 
In this paper the borrowers' default behaviour is described by a parsimonious Vasicek style 
one-factor-model which is derived from a Merton asset-value model. With the assumption of 
a CAPM-conform asset pricing on capital markets, we are able to calculate risk-neutral 




We assume that the value  t i V ,  of a firm i follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift  i μ  
and volatility  i σ , ie 
   t i i i
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, ⋅ + ⋅ = σ μ  (1) 
t i W ,  denotes the Wiener process. It is also assumed that for the firm value at time t=0  0 0 , > i V  
holds. 
It follows from the assumption of geometric Brownian motion that: 
(1) At maturity T and for a given value  0 , i V  , the firm's value  T i V ,  equals  
  { } T i i i i i T i W T V V ,
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By the introduction of a systematic risk factor  T M  in the spirit of the one-period CAPM, that 
influences the asset returns of all firms, equation (3) can be rewritten as 
  T i i u T m i
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(i = 1,…,n).  T M  denotes the standard normally distributed market factor and  iT U  denotes the 
idiosyncratic risk factor of firm i which is also standard normal. We assume that the random 
variables  nT T U U ,..., 1 and  T M  are independent.  i β  represents the beta factor of firm i.  m σ  and 
i u, σ  are the volatilities of the market factor and of the idiosyncratic risks, respectively.  
Expectation and variance of  T i S ,  are  
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A statistical default model (one-factor-model) 
An additional assumption is that debt consists of a zero-coupon bond with a nominal value  i K  
and maturity T, as in Merton’s firm value model. A default can only occur at maturity, and 
only when the firm's value at maturity T is smaller than the debt value. The liabilities  
 
7
therefore represent preferential claims on the firm's value. At maturity, the liabilities match 
the nominal value of the zero-coupon bond. 
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where  T i R ,  is the standardised rate of return and the standardised default threshold 
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For the standardised rate of return T i R , , the following holds: 
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With equation (6) we arrive at the well-known single-factor-model. In particular in 
homogeneous portfolios ( ρ ρ = i ) the sensitivity coefficient ρ is often referred to as the asset 
correlation. 
The conditional probability of default with given realisation of the market factor results in  
























In practice, the probability of default  T i p ,  may be given externally by the obligor`s rating. In 
this case the (standardised) default threshold can be calculated from   ) ( , , T i
P
T i p c
1 − Φ = . 
In addition, a default time  i τ  is defined for every borrower, and  } { T i ≤ τ 1 denotes the default 
indicator, which takes on the value 1 if the expression in brackets holds (i.e. a default occurs 
until maturity) and is otherwise 0.  
If we denote the recovery rate conditional on the default of borrower i by  i RR  (which is 
assumed fixed) and his exposure at default by  i EAD , the loss contribution of the borrower is 
given by  
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   () ( ) } { T i i i i RR EAD T L ≤ ⋅ − ⋅ = τ 1 1 ,  
and the expected loss is 
                                       T i i i i p RR EAD T EL , ) 1 ( ) ( ⋅ − ⋅ =                                       (8) 
 
Valuation 
In the following, a flat term structure with a risk-free interest rate r is assumed. For simplicity, 
zero bonds with a nominal value K = 1 and maturity T are considered. The current price of a 
zero bond (with default risk) is denoted by ) , 0 ( T Bd . 
In general, the price of a derivative financial instrument is the present value of the expected 
cash flows under the risk-neutral measure Q. 
For a zero bond subject to default risk (with K = 1), we obtain the following (for simplicity 
the index i has been omitted): 
  () ( ) {} () {} () T T
Q d RR E rT T B ≤ > ⋅ + ⋅ − = τ τ τ 1 1 exp , 0  
where τ  denotes the stochastic default time and RR (τ) the recovery rate. 
Assuming a constant recovery rate RR (τ) = RR, we get  
   () ()( ) ( ) () () T Q RR T Q T B T Bd > − ⋅ + > ⋅ = τ τ 1 , 0 , 0 . (9) 
T q T Q − = > 1 ) (τ  denotes the risk-neutral survival probability,  T q denotes the risk-neutral 
default probability, and  ) , 0 ( T B  is the price of the risk-free bond. 
Using the bond price, the credit spread s can also be calculated
2:  
   r T B
T
s
d − − = ) , 0 ( ln
1
  
Risk-neutral default probabilities 
Just like the real PDs, the risk-neutral default probabilities can be derived from the asset-value 
model. For the log asset return of firm i under the risk-neutral measure follows 
   T i i u T m i
i













                                                 
2 However, often higher spreads are observed on the market than the values calculated using the Merton model, 
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Because the asset-value model’s drift parameter (the expected asset return) is smaller under 
the measure Q, the risk-neutral default probability is higher than the real default probability. 
The same holds for the default threshold, as we again model default event via standardized 
asset returns. 
The default threshold for modelling risk-neutral probabilities is given by 
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where δ  denotes the Sharpe ratio of the market.  
The connection between real and risk-neutral default probabilities can be expressed by the 
following equation:  
   () ( ) T p q i T i T i ⋅ ⋅ + Φ Φ =
− δ ρ , ,
1  (11) 
The difference between real and risk neutral default probability represents a risk premium for 
systematic risk. The magnitude of the risk premium follows the logic of the CAPM. 
Systematic uncertainties concerning future cash-flows of an investment cannot be eliminated 
through diversification, and thus represent risks, that have to be compensated by higher 
returns of that investment. 
The market factor  T M  determines via the asset-value process the conditional default 
probability and therefore the conditional expected cash-flows to investors. The higher  i ρ , the 
higher the sensitivity of credit instruments to systematic risks and the higher the risk premium 
asked by investors. 
Finally, let us consider the special case of the asset with the maximum systematic risk for a 
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Then, the bond price is given by 
1
, (0, ) ( (1 ) )
dr T
iT B Te p T δ
−− =⋅ Φ Φ − − ⋅.                                             
This is the price of a digital call option on the market factor  T M , which pays $1 if  S MT >  
and otherwise 0. The strike price S  is set so that the option is out of the money with a 
probability of , iT p . Coval/Jurek/Stafford (2009a) call this option the cheapest-to-supply asset 
with a given rating (expressed by the PD or hitting probability , iT p ). If the recovery rate is 
greater than zero, the bond price can be derived from (9). 
 
EL profile and valuation 
A connection between the expected losses and therefore the expected cash-flows and the 
realisation of the market factor  T M  can easily be established. Using equations (7) and (8) it 
follows for the expected loss given the value of the market factor expressed as percentage of 
exposure at default: 
   () T T i i T i M p RR M T EL , ) 1 ( ) | ( ⋅ − =  (12) 
We refer to this relationship in the following as the “EL profile” considering it as a function 
of the realisations  T m . It represents in our framework all systematic uncertainty concerning 
future losses and thus contains all information relevant for pricing considerations. 
Further uncertainty, i. e. uncertainty concerning the actual realisations of losses given a value 
of  T M , is of idiosyncratic nature and can be eliminated through diversification in a 
sufficiently large portfolio and thus is not relevant for pricing. 
Two credit products, showing identical EL-profiles, are exposed to identical systematic risks 
and therefore should realise the same market price in the absence of arbitrage. This conclusion 




3   Tranching and reallocating risks 
3.1   Tranching and rating-based risk measures 
CDOs are securities which transform the credit risk of the underlying collateral pool into a set 
of securities with different credit and loss profiles. Here we only consider a simplified 
version, and do not take into account the waterfall describing the priority of payments which 
is often quite complex. Instead we assume a strict subordination principle. If there are defaults 
in the collateral, losses first impact the equity tranche (first-loss piece). If the number of 
defaults is so great that the losses exceed the equity tranche’s volume, the mezzanine tranches 
incur losses and the mezzanine holders start to see a reduced coupon and principal. The 
tranche with the highest subordination is the senior tranche. It only has to absorb losses if all 
tranches with lower subordination are wiped out. 
The loss distribution of the underlying collateral pool is crucial for determining each tranche’s 
risk profile. The collateral pool’s loss on a percentage basis is an aggregation of individual 
losses. Using  ∑ =
i
i EAD EAD we obtain: 






















) ( τ 1  (13) 
The loss distribution of a tranche relates to the loss distribution of the collateral pool. 
Generally the tranche’s status is determined by its upper and lower limits – its attachment and 
detachment point. 
Let us consider a tranche with attachment point  %) 100 ; 0 [ ∈ a  and detachment point 
%] 100 ; (a b ∈ . The tranche only suffers losses when the losses in the collateral pool until 
maturity  T  exceed the attachment point a. If the accumulated losses in the reference portfolio 
remain below a,  then the tranche does not sustain any losses. On the other hand, if the 
accumulated losses exceed the detachment point b during the period, this results in a total loss 
for the tranche.  
The probability that the accumulated losses in the collateral pool exceed the attachment point 
a by the end of the contract duration T, 
   ) ( ) ) ( ( } ) ( { a T L
tr
T E a T L P p > = > = 1 , (14) 
denotes the “hitting probability" or PD of the tranche. It indicates the probability that the 
tranche will be hit during the period, i.e. whether it will suffer any loss. It depends solely on 
the subordination, i.e. the attachment point a, and not from the tranche “thickness” b – a.  
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If the tranche is hit, then the size of the loss is of course also relevant. The accumulated 
percentage tranche loss can be derived from 
   } ) ( { } ) ( { ) ) ( (
1
) ( b T L b T L a tr a T L
a b
T L > ≤ ≤ + ⋅ −
−
= 1 1 . (15) 
An important parameter, which is needed for the pricing in particular, is the expected tranche 
loss. This is given by  





T L tr x dF a x
a b
b T L P T L E ). ( ) (
1
) ) ( ( )) ( ( ) (  (16) 
Using partial integration, this can be expressed by (see Jobst, 2007, p 298) 





T L tr dx x F
a b
T L E . )) ( 1 (
1
)) ( ( ) (  (17) 
) ( 1 ) ( x F T L −  represent the “hitting probabilities” as a function of  x. In special cases the 
expected tranche loss can be approximated analytically or asymptotically, but generally it has 
to be calculated based on simulation.  
In general, the rating of a tranche is based on the hitting probability or the expected loss. If the 
rating is based on the hitting probability, it represents a “first dollar of loss” rating and the 
likelihood of an investor facing any loss at all until maturity is estimated. The “thickness” or 
width b – a  of the tranche is taken into consideration for a rating based on expected tranche 
loss.  
Other important risk measures include the variance or volatility of the tranche loss, the 
tranche's unexpected loss, or value at risk and expected shortfall parameters. Generally these 
measures can only be determined by simulation.  
3.2   The systematic risk of CDO tranches 
In this section the sensitivity of CDO tranches to systematic risks is studied in some detail. 
This involves analysing the default behaviour of CDO tranches as a function of the market 
factor M (for simplicity subscript T is omitted) and comparing it with that of the collateral 
pool or a corporate bond with a comparable rating. To illustrate the differences, a sample 
portfolio is considered for the collateral pool, and a sample CDO is generated. The collateral 
pool loss, the tranche losses (see (15)), and the corresponding risk measures are calculated 
using stochastic simulation.    
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Sample collateral pool and CDO 
We consider the default behaviour and potential losses of a CDO with a maturity of five years 
(T=5). A homogeneous portfolio of 100 equally weighted corporate bonds with a BBB rating 
is used as the collateral pool. The empirical five-year S&P default rate of  % 25 . 3 = T p  is used 
to estimate the unconditional probabilities of default. In addition, a homogeneous asset 
correlation of  10 . 0 = ρ  and a constant recovery rate of  4 . 0 = i RR  is assumed for all collateral 
pool assets. The following tranching scheme with the associated attachment and detachment 
points is used: 
 
Tranche  Attachment Point Detachment Point Hitting Probability 
Senior 11.5%  100%  0.0014 
Mezzanine 6.5%  11.5%  0.0316 
Junior 4%  6.5%  0.1282 
Equity 0  4%  0.8545 
    Table 1: Definition of CDO tranches  
 
The hitting probabilities are calculated via simulation according to (14). If the tranche rating 
is based on the hitting probability, the mezzanine tranche has roughly a BBB rating which 
matches the rating of the bonds in the collateral pool. With a five-year hitting probability of  
14 bp the senior tranche has a AAA rating. 
Expected loss profile  
To analyse the increased sensitivity of CDO tranches to systematic risk, we consider the  EL-
profile, i.e. the expected tranche loss conditional on the realisation m of the market factor M  
) | ) ( ( m T L E tr  
as a function of m. 
The slope of the EL profile for poor (i.e. negative) market factor values is a measure of 
sensitivity to systematic risk.  
First, the collateral pool itself is analysed. If the pool is regarded as an index or considered as 
a single tranche, the homogeneous portfolio, based on the assumptions made and the single 
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However, this is exactly the same EL profile as for any bond contained in the collateral pool. 
This means that, in absolute value, the collateral pool and the bond contain exactly the same 
systematic risk. The diversification is expressed in the fact that the idiosyncratic risks are 
reduced and therefore the share of systematic risk increases. In the case at hand of a 
homogeneous portfolio, conditional on the market factor the losses are binomially distributed 
and the variance of the conditional losses is reduced as the number of bonds in the pool 
increases. 
The situation changes dramatically if the loss distribution is split into several tranches and a 
single tranche is analysed. For example, the mezzanine tranche of our sample CDO shows the 
following EL profile (calculated via simulation): 
 
Figure 2: EL profiles of the BBB mezzanine tranche and BBB bond 
 
The EL profile for one of the collateral pool’s bonds (BBB rated) is also shown for 
comparison. Notice that the hitting probability of the mezzanine tranche approximately 
matches the bonds default probability. This suggests that the tranche’s rating based on the 
hitting probability would also be BBB. Figure 2 graphically illustrates that the default  
 
15
behaviour of CDO tranches and bonds differs drastically with regard to the influence of 
systematic risk. Given unfavourable values for the systematic risk factor, the curve of the 
tranche rises much more steeply than for a corporate bond with similar rating. 
A consequence of the sharply increased systematic risk is rapid and drastic rating downgrades 
in bad economic times. In a good macroeconomic environment (high values of M), the 
tranche is hardly ever hit, while the corresponding conditional expected losses for the 
collateral pool or for a single corporate bond are always slightly higher. In such a favourable 
scenario, changes to the systematic risk factor have almost no effect on the hitting probability 
or expected loss of the tranche, and CDO ratings appear very stable with regard to   
macroeconomic changes. This impression is deceptive, however. If the systematic risk factor 
comes under stress, CDOs (unlike corporate bonds) prove extremely sensitive to an economic 
downturn. In this critical region, even a small change of the market factor causes a dramatic 
deterioration in the tranche’s credit quality. It is precisely this phenomenon that can be 
observed in the US subprime crisis. Falling house prices and rising interest rates triggered a 
downward spiral resulting from rising insolvencies, house sales and plummeting prices, and 
the macroeconomic situation of the US housing market entered a critical phase. This led to 
drastic downgrades of hundreds of CDO tranches which contained these loans in their 
reference portfolios.  
Another important consequence stems from the price relevance of systematic risk, which was 
possibly not adequately appreciated by investors. The considerably increased systematic risk 
of the tranches needs to be compensated for by a significantly higher spread compared with 
corporate bond spreads. If the prices of CDO tranches and bonds are the same or do not differ 
sufficiently, CDO issuers can exploit this to their advantage. This may provide a further 
explanation for the emergence of “CDO arbitrage”. The price-relevant aspects are discussed 
in detail in section 4.  
 
Loan equivalent “bond representation” for quantifying the systematic risk of a CDO tranche 
The sensitivity of a borrower or bond, respectively, to systematic risk is expressed in the 
single factor model by the correlation parameter ρ  (assumed to be homogeneous). In this 
section we estimate the asset correlation associated with a CDO tranche treating the structured 
instrument as a single-name credit instrument. Thus we treat the CDO tranche as a “virtual” 
borrower or bond, and approximate its default behaviour likewise using a single factor model. 
Our aim is to estimate the “virtual” asset correlation 
tr ρ  of the CDO tranche. 
Considering a CDO tranche as a virtual bond, the conditional hitting probability is expressed 
























) ( . (18) 
The default threshold 
tr c  can be calculated using the unconditional hitting probability given 
in (14). In this approach (see, for example, Yahalom/Levy/Kaplan, 2008) the loss given 
default (LGD) of the tranche has to be specified in a separate model.  
Here we introduce another approach. A key observation is that the LGD of a CDO tranche is 
always a random variable that depends on the market factor. This is because the tranche loss 
depends on the defaults in the collateral pool, and the defaults, in turn, depend on the market 
factor.  Note that this is usually not the case with a straight bond where default and LGD may 
be independent. A CDO tranche's sensitivity to systematic risk can be increased further by the 
dependence of tranche loss on the market factor. This additional systematic risk is contained 
in the expected loss profile. Therefore we consider the EL profile as the tranche`s risk profile 
and not the tranche’s conditional hitting probability. Moreover, as outlined in the previous 
section, the EL profile contains all the information necessary for pricing. The EL profile is 
obtained via stochastic simulation. For the “bond representation”, however, we assume a 
constant LGD* for the tranche (instead of the random loss given default depending on the 
market factor). 







m p tr tr
T =  (19) 







T = . 
The unconditional expected tranche loss is also calculated in the simulation, and the default 
threshold  tr c is given by  




− Φ = . 
In the next step, the tranche LGD* is determined as the maximum loss of the tranche. 
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which reduces to  LGD RR Lmax = − =1  for a homogeneous portfolio. 
Based on this, the maximum loss for a tranche with attachment point a and detachment point 
b is  
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if  a L > max . In the unrealistic case  a L < max , the tranche cannot be hit at all. Its LGD is then 
always zero. In general,  1 * = LGD  for all tranches except senior or super-senior tranches. 
Thus  1 *< LGD  only for the tranche with the highest seniority (with detachment point 1). For 
the non-senior tranches, the “implied” hitting probability profile of the "virtual" 
approximating bond is set equal to the EL profile, while the EL profile is scaled up for the 
senior tranche with  1 *< LGD . 
Finally, the “virtual” asset correlation 
tr ρ  is calculated by means of optimization 
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and  ) m ( p k
tr
T  is given in (19) evaluated at  k m . 
K
k k ) m ( 1 =  is a sufficiently accurate 
discretization of the support of M.  
In summary, a CDO tranche is approximated by a “virtual” bond in a single-factor model 
according to (6) with unconditional (“implied”) hitting probability 
tr
T p , asset correlation 
tr ρ and LGD* as the loss given default. This “bond representation” is a more appropriate 
approximation of the default behaviour and the loss profile than an approximation based on 
the conditional hitting probability of the tranche. 
The estimation results for all tranches of the sample CDO are summarised in Table 2. 
 
Tranche  tr
T p  (%)  tr ρ   LGD* 
Senior (11.5 - 100%)    0.00615  0.3196  0.548 
Mezzanine (6.5 - 11.5%)    0.93444  0.7572  1 
Junior (4 - 6.5%)    6.45767  0.7518  1 
Equity (0 - 4%)  43.57131  0.4214  1 
Collateral Pool  3.25     0.1       0.6 




From Table 2 it can be seen that in our approach 
tr
T p  is rather an artificial parameter for 
fitting the EL profile than a hitting probability. 
tr
T p  corresponds to the unconditional expected 
loss for the non-senior tranches of the sample transaction. The parameter  tr ρ can be 
interpreted as the tranche’s “virtual” asset correlation. It can be seen that the values of 
tr ρ   are 
much higher than those for comparable corporate bonds (e.g.  1 . 0 = ρ  for the collateral pool's 
assets) reflecting the drastically increased sensitivity of CDO tranches to systematic risks. 
The following Figure shows the bond representation's fit for the mezzanine tranche. It 
indicates a very good fit of the EL profile obtained from the simulation and function 
) m ( p ~
k
tr
T  in (21) derived from the optimization procedure with given default threshold and 
estimated “virtual” asset correlation.
3 
 
Figure 3: Comparison of the mezzanine tranche’s EL profile with the bond representation’s profile 
Impact of subordination  
For the rating process of a structured finance transaction a tranche`s subordination plays a key 
role. The higher the subordination the more losses in the collateral pool are absorbed by 
tranches with lower seniority. Thus, higher seniority lowers the hitting probability and allows 
higher rating grades. The EL profiles for the tranches are shown in Figure 4 below. 
                                                 
3 In the case of equity tranches and broad senior tranches, the bond approximation reveals somewhat larger 
deviations from the EL profile of each CDO tranche. However, the approximation errors are negligible for the 




Figure 4:  EL profiles of all tranches of the sample CDO 
 
The position of the critical regions, in which the market factor has a strong effect on the 
tranche`s losses (the EL profile has a steep slope), depends on the degree of subordination. 
This area can be shifted towards the left side of the diagram (i.e. a scenario of economic 
depression) by increasing the subordination. It is evident that the macroeconomic 
environment must worsen greatly before a senior tranche is hit. However, if the critical area is 
reached, the credit assessment of even highly rated tranches may suffer drastic downgrades as 
we have seen in the current subprime crisis. 
Investment in CDO tranches versus investment in the collateral pool 
At this point the key difference between an investment in the collateral pool (“vertical” 
tranching) and investment in a tranche (“horizontal” tranching) can be made clear. Let us 
consider the sample collateral pool with an average BBB rating and the mezzanine tranche 
(6.5 - 11.5%), which also has a BBB rating in accordance with its hitting probability. If the 
transaction's total nominal amount is 1 billion Dollar, an investor can, for example, purchase 
the mezzanine tranche for $50 million or he can invest this amount in a portfolio which is 
comparable with or equivalent to the collateral pool. By construction, both investments have 
the same implied PD. However, the two investments have significant differences regarding 
their other risk characteristics. The main difference stems from the fact that, in the latter case, 
the investment is made in the entire loss distribution of the pool, whereas in the case of a 
tranche, the investment is made in a specific part of the loss distribution. The collateral pool's  
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risks are completely reallocated by the tranching process. On the one hand, a large senior 
tranche is created which has a much smaller default risk than that of the collateral pool's 
assets. On the other hand, the systematic risk (sensitivity to the market factor) of all tranches 
rises massively. It is true that building a large collateral pool diversifies idiosyncratic risk, so 
that only systematic risk remains. Such an investment in a well diversified pool is seen as an 
advantage of CDO tranches. However, the systematic risk remains unchanged in absolute 
terms in the collateral pool ( 1 . 0 = ρ ; see Table 2), while, by contrast, the tranches’ systematic 
risk rises dramatically (e.g.  75 . 0 =
tr ρ  for junior and mezzanine tranches; see Table 2). For 
this reason, a portfolio of BBB tranches from different securitisations (of the same type), for 
example, is much riskier than a portfolio of comparable bonds or investments in different 
collateral pools. In particular, the addition of CDO tranches to bond or loan portfolios raises 
the probability of large portfolio losses, i.e. CDO tranches affect the tail of the loss 
distribution. A consequence is considerably higher risk contributions measured by value at 
risk or expected shortfall contributions, respectively.  
 
4   Valuation of tranches and CDO arbitrage 
The simple valuation model introduced in section 2 is used to identify potential possibilities 
of mispricing of the securities generated by the tranching. We do not compare expliciltly 
model and market spreads (see, for example, Coval/Jurek/Stafford, 2009a, and 
Brennan/Hein/Poon, 2009). Instead we analyze which opportunities for CDO arbitrage are 
available if investors ignore the tranches’ systematic risk and base their pricing solely on the 
rating in the form of hitting probability or expected losses. 
The results presented in the preceding sections allow us to achieve the above mentioned 
objective of an approximate tranche pricing with the following three steps: 
(1) Starting point is the aggregation of all pricing relevant information and results in 
generating the tranche’s EL-profile (by simulation, see sections 2 and 3.2). 
(2) The risk parameters of a “virtual” bond are calculated in a way, that the EL-profile of this 
bond replicates the tranche’s profile. We call this the “bond representation”. (see section 3.2) 
(3) This bond can be priced with equation (9) presented in section 2; sharing the same 
sensitivity towards systematic risks, the tranche and the virtual bond are equally priced. As a 
result, we arrive at the price for the tranche. Again, we assume a zero-coupon structure. 
It can be seen from (9) that the bond price falls as the risk-neutral PD increases. In line with 
(11), the risk-neutral PD increases – ceteris paribus – as the systematic risk rises. This means  
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that bonds with the same real PD  T p  should have very different prices depending on their 
exposure to systematic risk. 
Application to the sample CDO 
In the following the present values of the tranches and the collateral pool are calculated using 
the results from Table 2. This involves determining the risk-neutral PD using equation (11), 
incorporating each of the "virtual" asset correlations of the bond representation. For the 
Sharpe ratio of the market we assume  4 . 0 = δ  Then, the values of the tranches are calculated 
from (9), assuming a constant risk-free interest rate  04 . 0 = r . The valuations are always based 







Senior (11,5 % - 100,0 %)  81.843 
Mezzanine (6,5 % - 11,5 %)  77.140 
Junior (4,0 % - 6,5 %)  63.100 
Equity (0,0 % - 4,0 %)  27.650 
Collateral Pool  78.960 
           Table 3:  Tranche prices (based on bond representation) 
 
The sum of all tranche values weighted by their respective share in the capital structure equals 
the value of the collateral pool (up to rounding errors). 
For comparison, another valuation of the non-equity tranches is conducted, assuming a 
uniform asset correlation of  1 . 0 = ρ  for these tranches according to the assets in the collateral 
pool. This is designed to replicate the valuation approach of an investor, who has the rating of 
a tranche (i.e. hitting probability or expected loss) at hand, but ignores the increased 
sensitivity to systematic risks and instead assumes a “bond-typical” behaviour. The value of 
the equity tranche is then calculated such that the sum-total matches the value of the collateral 





Senior (11,5 % - 100,0 %)  81.868 
Mezzanine (6,5 % - 11,5 %)  80.293 
Junior (4,0 % - 6,5 %)  72.980 
Equity (0,0 % - 4,0 %)  16.812 
Collateral Pool  78.960  
    Table 4:  Tranche prices (based on an asset correlation of ρ = 0.1) 
 
A comparison of the results in Tables 3 and 4 shows how a CDO arranger who retains the 
equity tranche can exploit the situation to his advantage. If he succeeds in selling the non-
equity tranches in line with their rating (according to the real PD or expected losses) like 
corporate bonds, investors will pay an excessive price and will receive inadequate spreads for 
the tranches' systematic risk. For the equity tranche, by contrast, the situation is reversed. The 
value in Table 4 shows that the price of the equity tranche as the “residual tranche” is 
significantly too low. If the equity tranche spread is an “excess spread”, this creates the 
possibility to generate a positive net capital value from the overall transaction. Put another 
way, the holders of the equity tranche charge a very high premium for the apparently high 
risk.
4  
The results indicate that investors should receive much higher spreads for their investments in 
CDOs as a risk premium than that which they are paid on comparable corporate bonds. This 
was obviously not the case in the years prior to the start of the subprime crisis (see Brennan et 
al, 2008). During this period there were virtually no differences between the prices of CDO 
tranches and those of similarly rated corporate bonds. In some cases the spreads of corporate 
bonds were even lower than the spreads of  tranches with similar ratings. 
In summary, there is a general way to CDO arbitrage when the non-equity tranches of a CDO 
can be sold at the prices of corporate bonds with comparable ratings. In this case, it is 
                                                 
4 This underscores a remark by Tavakoli (2006), which points out that investors in equity tranches should never 
accept an upfront payment and a fixed spread, which is usual with credit indices. Instead, they should always 




advantageous for the CDO arranger to put together the collateral pool in such a way that the 
tranching creates securities with a very high systematic risk whose true prices should be close 
to those of the respective cheapest-to-supply assets. This provides the maximum potential 
profit for the arranger from the transaction.  
In the next section we describe some possibilities of generating tranches with high systematic 
risk. It comes as no surprise that precisely these types of transactions can be found in many  
CDOs issued prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis.  
 
5   Generating tranches with high systematic risk 
5.1   Increasing the number of assets in the collateral pool 
It is often claimed that a key advantage of investing in a CDO tranche is that it offers the 
possibility to invest in an already well diversified portfolio. Additionally, if the systematic 
risk of the portfolio is low, the unexpected loss decreases and realised losses are usually close 
to expected loss. While this is basically correct, it is often forgotten that this applies only 
when an investment is made in the entire collateral pool, in other words when just one single 
tranche is formed. When tranches are created, however, a reallocation of risks occurs whereby 
the systematic risk of each tranche increases drastically and is much higher than the 
systematic risk in the collateral pool. This sensitivity to systematic risk is strengthened if the 
number of assets in the collateral pool is increased. To illustrate this, let us consider the case 
in which the number of assets in the homogeneous collateral pool is increased from 100 to 
500, while the individual risk characteristics of the assets remain unchanged. A tranching 
scheme is used which produces approximately the same ratings for the non-equity tranches as 











Tranche AP  DP  Hitting 
Probability 
Senior 10.25%  100%  0.0017 
Mezzanine    5.75%  10.25%  0.0317 
Junior    3.5%    5.75%  0.1335 
Equity  0    3.5%   
    Table 5: Definition of the CDO tranches (n=500) 
 
 
The following results are obtained for the bond representation: 
 
Tranche Implied  HP  (%)  tr ρ   LGD* 
Senior (10.25 - 100%)  0.0055  0.5464  0.554 
Mezzanine (5.75 - 10.25%)  0.9947  0.8990  1 
Junior (3.5 - 5.75%)  7.091    0.9038  1 
Equity (0 - 3.5%)  49.809  0.4114  1 
Collateral Pool  3.25  0.1  0.6 
  Table 6: Parameter estimations for the CDO tranches (n=500) 
 
First it can be seen that the collateral pool’s risk characteristics – as far as they are relevant for 
the CDOs’ risk analysis – have not changed. Although the relative share of idiosyncratic risk 
has dropped due to further diversification, this is not price-relevant. In absolute terms 
(expressed by the covariation with the market factor), the systematic risk is unchanged. The 
price of the collateral pool thus also remains the same.  
However, for the CDO tranches matters have changed. Apart from the equity tranche, all 
tranches show a further increase in systematic risk. As described above, this strengthens the 
CDO arbitrage. The following Table shows the tranche prices according to bond 
approximation including the actual systematic risk, as well as the prices of comparable 
corporate bonds ) 1 . 0 ( = ρ . Additionally, the prices for the respective cheapest-to-supply assets 
are given for the non-equity tranches.  
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  Tranche Price 





Senior   81.842  81.865  81.806 
Mezzanine   76.207  80.209  75.683 
Junior   59.923  72.228  58.727 
Equity 23.309  7.339   
  Table 7:  Tranche prices including the actual systematic risk, valued like comparable corporate bonds, 
and cheapest-to-supply assets 
 
It can be seen that the valuation of the non-equity tranches on the basis of corporate bonds 
produces roughly the same prices as before because of the comparable ratings of the tranches. 
However, taking the actual systematic risk into account, the prices ought to be distinctly lower 
– especially for the junior and mezzanine tranches – to compensate for the increased risk. On 
the other hand, the equity tranche offers extremely high spreads and thus drastically higher 
potential returns because of its very low price. 
Finally it should be noted that a sufficiently large number of assets in the collateral pool 
always produces tranches with high systematic risk. This also holds if the asset correlation 
between the assets in the reference portfolio is very low, some of them may even be 
uncorrelated. Thus the process of bundling a large number of assets with a low systematic risk 
via securitisation with subsequent tranching generates securities with a very high systematic 
risk. Among others, this applies to US residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS).  
A further example illustrates the point. If an (extremely low) asset correlation of 0.01 is 
assumed for the assets in the collateral pool (other risk parameters remain unchanged) and the 
number of assets is increased to 2000 (which is the case with many ABS and RMBS), the 
tranche from 3.5 to 5.75%, which now has approximately an A rating, has an estimated asset 
correlation of 0.6.  
 
5.2   Inclusion of assets with a high systematic risk in the collateral pool 
Another way of generating tranches with a very high systematic risk is to include assets which 
already have a high systematic risk in the collateral pool, while leaving the number of assets  
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at roughly 100 to 150. Examples are ABS CDOs (SF CDOs), in particular ABS CDOs with 
subprime exposure, whose collateral pools contain RMBS mezzanine tranches, for instance. 
These assets already have a high systematic risk, and second-layer securitisation further 
significantly raises the systematic risk of the resulting tranches. The situation is similar for 
many transactions of the CDO-squared type. The collateral pools of these structured finance 
instruments are frequently composed of tranches which are in turn the product of 
securitisations from the same or similar segments (eg car loans, credit card receivables, 
leasing contracts), or include tranches of synthetic CDOs with overlapping names. In all these 
cases, the tranches of the first-layer securitisations are already highly correlated. The second-
layer securitisation further increases the sensitivity of the resulting tranches to systematic risk.  
Credit default swaps (CDSs) on ABS or MBS additionally increase sensitivity to systematic 
risk. This was evident, in particular, on the market for MBS CDOs with subprime exposure. If 
an underlying MBS tranche suffers a loss, this directly leads to a credit event for the 
associated synthetic MBS CDS. Correlation is perfect in this case. This leveraging of real 
MBS bonds multiplies the effect of the defaults on subprime loans and may result in an abrupt 
loss of value if economic conditions deteriorate. 
For synthetic CDOs, the credit risks in the collateral pool are transferred via credit default 
swaps (CDSs). For these transactions, it is useful to look for CDSs that offer as high a spread 
as possible for a given rating. This is the case where the underlying enterprises exhibit 
additional risks, in particular systematic risks. For example, according to estimates (see 
Bruyere, 2006, p 126), the collateral pools of the vast majority of synthetic arbitrage CDOs in 
2002 and 2003 included the tobacco company Philip Morris. This was because the potential 
risk of further legal sanctions against the tobacco industry was reflected in a high spread, but 
the rating was unchanged at BBB. As the agency models only took into account the default 
risk (in the form of the BBB rating) in their tranche rating, this offers additional opportunities 
for CDO arbitrage for the issuers. 
5.3   Creating as many tranchelets as possible 
Finally, it is possible to slice the collateral portfolio up into a large number of very thin 
tranches (tranchelets). These tranchelets are extremely sensitive to systematic risk. Thus it is 
always advantageous for CDO issuers to generate as many tranches as possible in a 
securitisation. 
Similarly, virtually only tranches with a width of just a few percentage points were generated 
in the construction of single-tranche CDO swaps. This also applies structured instruments 
where several tranches were created but the capital structure was not completely placed with  
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investors. Where the tranches created in this manner are included in another securitisation’s 
collateral pool, the new tranches’ sensitivity to the market factor is further raised. If investors 
ignore the higher systematic risk in such a tranche and focus only on the rating, the seller can 
exploit this to his advantage, as outlined above. 
A particularly instructive example of splitting a tranche into two new tranches with the 
possibility of CDO arbitrage is where a senior tranche is divided into a super-senior tranche 
and a lower AAA tranche. This approach is customary for CDO structuring and is discussed 
very critically, particularly in Tavakoli (2006). 
By way of illustration, we will look at the capital structure shown in Table 5. The senior 
tranche (10.25%-100%) has a hitting probability of 17 basis points (bp) (for a period of 5 
years), which corresponds to an AAA rating. If it is assumed, for example, that LIBOR + 
30bp is payable for an AAA-rated bond, investors would receive 30bp for almost 90% of the 
total nominal amount for a synthetic (unfunded) CDO.  
Now, a super-senior tranche is set up with an attachment point of 12.25%. This tranche has a 
hitting probability of about 4 bp and is claimed “virtually without default risk” according to 
the CDO arranger. It should therefore be possible (and this was generally the case) to insure 
its risk with a monoliner at low cost of, say, 6 bp or, alternatively, to retain the risk on the 
books. In this way, a saving of 24 bp is achieved for 87.75% of the total nominal amount.  
The hitting probability for the next lower tranche of 10.25%-12.25% remains unchanged. If 
the rating is based on the hitting probability, the tranche retains its AAA rating and therefore 
also its price if investors focus only on the rating. However, the other risk characteristics have 
changed dramatically, in particular in terms of expected loss and sensitivity to systematic risk. 
As a consequence, the price, too, must change, and investors should demand a significantly 
higher spread to compensate them for the higher risks. Table 8 shows the results of bond 
representation and valuation. 
 
Tranche Implied  HP  tr ρ   LGD* Price 
Senior (10.25 - 100%)  0.000055  0.5465  0.554  81.842 
Senior(10.25 - 12.25%)  0.000978  0.9547  1  80.792 
  Table 8:   Bond approximation and valuation of the senior tranche of the original structure and the 
senior tranche with the same attachment point, which is below the super senior tranche  
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  6   Discussion and conclusion 
In line with Brennan/Hein/Poon (2009) and Coval/Jurek/Stafford (2009a), this paper presents 
mispricing of CDO tranches as an explanation for the exceptional growth of arbitrage CDOs 
prior to the onset of the financial crisis. Although CDO tranches initially offered more yield 
than cash assets (bonds or loans) with similar ratings, the spread differences, which declined 
continuously from 2005 onwards, were far too low to compensate for the additional 
systematic risk. Securitization of the collateral pool and tranching means risks are completely 
reallocated. While the probability of default and expected loss of a large portion of the capital 
structure are distinctly lower than for an average collateral pool asset, the systematic risk of 
all tranches rises dramatically. If investors focus exclusively on the tranches’ rating, they are 
very likely to pay too high a price for the non-equity tranches. As the prices for the tranches, 
which are weighted according to the capital structure, add up to the value of the collateral 
pool, the fact that prices for the non-equity tranches are too high inevitably results in the price 
for the equity tranche being too low.  
The “bond representation” described in section 3 allows quantifying systematic risk treating a 
CDO tranche as a single-name credit instrument. The tranche is considered as a “virtual” 
borrower or bond for which a single-factor model holds. Then, the exposure to systematic risk 
is measured by the asset correlation. In addition, we derive risk neutral default probabilities 
using a simple valuation based on the CAPM and the single-factor Merton model. The risk 
neutral default probabilities also depend explicitly on the asset correlation. This allows 
pricing of CDO tranches as an explicit function of asset correlation. Thus we obtain different 
prices for bonds and tranches with the same rating depending on their exposure to systematic 
risk. The valuation of tranches and CDO arbitrage opportunities are discussed in section 4. 
The desire to exploit CDO arbitrage opportunities usually entails the construction of tranches 
with a high systematic risk. How this can be achieved was described in section 5. The 
collateral pool’s high degree of diversification was always regarded as a particular advantage 
(see, for example, Amato and Remolona, 2003). In the authors’ view, less collateral is needed 
to cover unexpected default losses if pool diversification is high, thus raising “arbitrage 
profits”. However, in section 5 it is shown that increasing the number of assets in the 
collateral pool leads to higher sensitivity to systematic risk of the tranches. Therefore, it is the 
investors who should be entitled to the “arbitrage profits” to compensate them for the 
tranches’ much higher systematic risk. In addition, a large number of assets is not necessary if 
the assets in the collateral pool already exhibit a high systematic risk. Prominent examples are  
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ABS CDOs, in particular MBS CDOs. The collateral pools of these CDO-squared instruments 
include a large proportion (roughly 80%, see BCBS, 2008) of BBB-rated RMBS mezzanine 
tranches. The RMBS tranches have a high hitting correlation. This means that the second-
layer tranches are much more sensitive to systematic risks. If the degree of hitting correlation 
of the tranches in the collateral pool is underestimated, the second-layer capital structure is 
such that the senior tranche with a very good rating is much too large. Another potential 
danger for MBS CDOs with subprime exposure results from the relatively small width of the 
mezzanine tranches in the collateral pool (2.5% to 4%) as well as the relatively low original 
level of subordination (between 3% and 5%). Prepayments during the contract’s life can 
temporarily increase subordination, but overall it remains low. Rising default rates for 
subprime loans combined with declining recovery rates may result in the BBB-rated 
mezzanine tranches in the original RMBS suffering losses. The extreme correlation then 
means a high likelihood that all BBB-rated tranches of subprime RMBS will be hit at the 
same time. In addition, their small width means that there is a high likelihood that they will all 
experience a total loss at the same time. This scenario means that the senior tranches of 
subprime MBS CDOs will likewise default. These subprime CDOs therefore exhibit an “all or 
nothing” risk profile
5: either the subprime default rates remain below the thresholds and the 
senior tranches of the subprime CDOs do not suffer any loss at all, or the thresholds are 
breached, and the senior tranches could all be wiped out. 
The opportunity to increase the value of the equity tranche by sophisticated tranching also 
undermines the importance investors in senior tranches attach to the fact, that the arranger of a 
transaction keeps the first-loss piece. Usually it is assumed, that this prevents the arranger 
which is mostly also the designer of the collateral pool, from overinvesting and thus ensures 
high collateral quality which also strengthens the position of senior tranche investors. 
However, if the arranger can gain profit solely from tranching, these profits offset losses from 
poor investment decisions, in other words, the credit quality of the collateral pool’s assets 
becomes less important as long as there are enough assets to form collateral pools. Thus, our 
findings can to some extent explain the surge in demand for MBS bonds before the financial 
crisis as well as the deteriorating credit quality in collateral pools. 
Another aspect concerns the role of through-the-cycle ratings for structured credit 
instruments. One of the key conclusions of this paper is that both the (conditional) hitting 
probabilities and the expected loss profiles for CDO tranches are highly dependent on 
systematic risks. The transition probabilities are similarly influenced by systematic risks. 
When the economy is doing well, CDO ratings are very stable. They can, however, become 
                                                 
5 See also BCBS (2008), p. 6 and appendix C  
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very volatile in an economic downturn, and there may be significant rating downgrades within 
a short space of time. This specific behaviour under stress makes a through-the-cycle rating 
for CDOs as well as the use of average transition matrices, which take no account of the 
current position in the credit cycle, questionable. In general, through-the-cycle ratings favour 
CDO arbitrage opportunities, in particular during an economic downturn. Consider, for 
instance, a synthetic CDO’s collateral pool consisting of CDS. Then, the higher default risks 
mean the CDS spreads are very likely to widen during an economic downturn. On the other 
hand, the through-the-cycle ratings remain largely unchanged. If a new CDO is structured 
with the same collateral pool, the resulting tranching scheme and the tranche prices are the 
same if one focuses exclusively on the rating, while the originator’s revenues from the 
collateral pool have risen.  
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